Cash-richer US companies acquire less during 1994-2008, contrasting the findings from earlier sample period. This result is mainly from companies of high residual market-tobook ratios (i.e. the actual market-to-book ratio purged of its variation due to agency conflicts). Cash-richer bidders have lower announcement abnormal returns only when bidder value uncertainty is low. The severity of agency conflicts does not affect the negative bidder cash reserve effect on bidder announcement abnormal returns. Post acquisition, cash-richer bidders spend more funds on debt reduction, capital expenditure, and less on acquisitions. Further, cash-richer bidder has better operating performance when its residual market-tobook ratio is high. We argue that bidder cash reserve effects are more consistent with the precautionary motive than with the agency theory. High bidder cash reserve relates to high growth and high overvaluation, not high agency conflict. † Cash-richer US companies acquire less during 1994-2008, contrasting the findings from earlier sample period. This result is mainly from companies of high residual market-tobook ratios (i.e. the actual market-to-book ratio purged of its variation due to agency conflicts). Cash-richer bidders have lower announcement abnormal returns only when bidder value uncertainty is low. The severity of agency conflicts does not affect the negative bidder cash reserve effect on bidder announcement abnormal returns. Post acquisition, cash-richer bidders spend more funds on debt reduction, capital expenditure, and less on acquisitions. Further, cash-richer bidder has better operating performance when its residual market-tobook ratio is high. We argue that bidder cash reserve effects are more consistent with the precautionary motive than with the agency theory. High bidder cash reserve relates to high growth and high overvaluation, not high agency conflict.
Introduction
Previous literature finds that a cash-rich company acquires more than a cash-poor one before year 1993 (Harford, 1999) , and a cash-richer bidder has worse abnormal returns at deal announcement (Lang et al., 1991; Freund et al., 2003; Schlingemann, 2004; and Harford, 1999) . These phenomena have been explained using the theoretical framework of agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) .
Nonetheless, we argue below that the bidder cash effects in acquisitions can be better explained using another prominent theory of corporate cash reserve, the precautionary motive. We empirically analyze bidder cash reserve effects in various stages of acquisitions and document results that are more consistent with the precautionary motive than with the agency theory. For example, for the period from 1994 to 2008, cash-richer companies surprisingly acquire less, contrasting previous findings. We summarize our empirical results later in the introduction after describing the theoretical foundation of the precautionary motive.
At the centre of the precautionary motive of cash reserve is the argument that valuemaximizing managers prefer to reserve cash if they perceive high future growth and believe expensive external financing undermines their opportunity to invest (i.e. underinvestment).
1
Cash reserve reduces managers' dependence on external financing and increases company value by reducing underinvestment. Therefore, under the precautionary motive, the level of cash reserve positively relates to managers' perception of a company's growth. Further, since growth opportunities are often difficult to evaluate, high cash reserve can be associated with high misvaluation. We argue that cash richness affects a company's tendency to acquire in two directions. On the one hand, a cash-rich company, and therefore a high growth company according to the precautionary motive, is more likely to become a bidder. The Q theory of Brainard and Tobin (1977) point out companies of high growth invest more than other companies do. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) maintain that growth is positively associated with a company's tendency to acquire. On the other hand, a high growth (and cash rich) bidder prefers to pay using stock in order to reserve cash for future growth, which is at odd with the target's preference for a cash offer (because target managers believe a high growth bidder's stock is more difficult to evaluate). Rational bidder company managers expect that such conflicts increase the cost of acquisition, and therefore are reluctant to bid.
1 External funds are expensive either because there are agency costs (Myers, 1977; Jensen and Meckling, 1986) , because market is uncertainty about the value of a company's asset in place (Myers and Majluf, 1984) , or because there is great uncertainty in a company's future cash flow (Brusco, Lopomo, Robinson and Viswanathan, 2007; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). it for the data to tell.
The cash reserve effect on bidder announcement return also has twofold. It depends on the relative strength of growth effect and misvaluation effect.
2 When the growth effect dominates, we expect a cash-rich bidder has better announcement effect than a cash-poor one.
This is because acquisition announcement resolves investment uncertainty and sends a signal of high growth (Schlingmann, 2004; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002；Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006) . When the overvaluation effect dominates, a cash-richer bidder has worse announcement effect because an acquisition announcement leads to revaluation.
Revaluation occurs at deal announcement for two reasons. First, acquisitions are salient events and attract investor closer scrutiny (Dong et al., 2006) , reducing overvaluation.
Second, there is an adverse selection effect of corporate cash reserve, i.e., if investors know that a company does not have to issue (stock) to invest, an attempt to do so sends a strong signal of overvaluation (Gao, 2011) . Building on the two-sided information asymmetry framework of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Brusco, Lopomo, Robinson and Viswanathan (2007) , Gao (2011) finds that, for all-stock offers, adverse selection is the primary reason that cash-richer bidders have worse announcement returns. The first reason applies regardless of the means of payment. The second reason is true for stock offers. It is important to note that the implications of precautionary motive for bidder announcement returns relates to new information revealed to the market. Therefore, the precautionary motive predicts that the cash reserve effect is stronger when there is more bidder information uncertainty, because the scope for new information is greater there. Table 1 summarizes the predicted cash reserve effects under the precautionary motive and the agency theory respectively. We further explain the predictions for post-acquisition operating performance and use of funds while we summarize our empirical results below.
To measure a company's cash richness, we calculate excess cash reserve ratio, following Opler, et al. (1999) . To introduce variation to the degree of precautionary motive, we estimate the residual market-to-book ratio. The actual market-to-book ratio (i.e. the sum of market value of equity and book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of book value of equity and book value of long-term debt) is affected by agency conflicts, because a company of less agency problem generates higher market value for each dollar historically invested (Dong, et al., 2006) . To purge the effect of agency conflicts from actual market-tobook ratio, in each year and for all firms that have market-to-book ratio and G-index available, we regress the actual market-to-book ratio on the logarithm of 1 plus G-Index, and use the residual (call it residual market-to-book ratio henceforth) to measure the component of actual market-to-book ratio attributable to growth. The residual market-to-book ratio positively relates to the precautionary motive, and is insensitive to the degree of agency conflicts.
We report four sets of results documented at different stages of acquisition. First, we surprisingly find using a logistic model that high cash reserve reduces the likelihood of a company being a bidder in the later sample period from 1994 to 2008. For our early sample period from 1980 to 1993, cash reserve marginally positively affects the likelihood of being a bidder, consistent with what Harford(1999) finds. 3 The positive cash reserve effect during 1980-1993 however is restricted to companies that have non-missing G-index (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2002) . 4 As is explained above, the fact that cash-rich companies acquire less is consistent with the precautionary motive but not with the agency theory. Our finding suggests that, after 1993, the precautionary motive is more relevant than the agency theory when explaining the cash reserve effect on acquisition propensity, while before 1993, the agency theory seemingly dominates. We further document that the negative effect of cash reserve on acquisition likelihood is mainly from the companies whose residual market-tobook ratio is high (top quartile). This result is consistent with the argument that when the precautionary motive is stronger, disagreement gets stronger between a bidder and a target over the means of payment. A company rationally expects such disagreement increases acquisition cost and refrains from bidding. In contrast, we fail to document that the cash reserve effect vary according to the level of G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2002) , inconsistent with the agency theory.
Second, we find that higher bidder cash reserve is associated with lower bidder cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which is consistent with the predictions of both the agency theories and the precautionary motive. To further examine which theory is more likely, we use bidder asset tangibility and G-index to introduce variation to the degree of precautionary motive and agency conflict respectively. 5 We find that the negative cash reserve effect vanishes when a bidder's asset tangibility is in the highest sample quartile where information uncertainty is the lowest, consistent with the precautionary motive. In contrast, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the negative cash reserve effect is insensitive to the change in G-index.
Our third set of results show that, when the residual market-to-book ratio is high, a cash-rich bidder outperforms a cash-poor one by 1% a year. This result can be interpreted in two ways under the precautionary motive. First, cash reserve facilitates a high growth bidder to capture synergies that arise from the combination of business. According to Myers and Majluf (1984) , financial slack enables a company to invest when the cost of external financing is prohibitively high, which increases company value ex ante. Second, when overvaluation is high, higher cash reserve relates to greater downward price adjustment. The merging companies need to perceive better synergies in order to justify the deal, and better synergies manifest themselves through better operating performance in post-acquisition years. In contrast, we do not find worse operating performance for a cash-rich bidder when G-index is high (high agency conflict).
Our fourth and final set of tests report that a cash-richer bidder spends less funds on acquisitions, contrary to the prediction of the agency theory (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008) . Consistent with overvaluation, a cash-richer bidder spends more funds on long-term debt reduction. This is because overvalued companies tend to use more funds to retire long-term debt (Stein, 1996; Hertzel and Li, 2009; and Kim and Weisbach, 2006) . We find mixed evidence for growth: a cash-richer bidder uses more funds on capital expenditure but less on research and development (R&D). It suggests that cash reserve facilitates merge companies to capture synergies arising from established businesses rather than business innovations.
Overall, our results are more consistent with the precautionary motive than the agency theory. We make three contributions. First, we argue that the precautionary motive is important in understanding bidder cash reserve effects. The precautionary motive has solid theoretical foundation (Brainard and Tobin, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswananthan, 2004; Brusco, et al., 2007; Opler et al., 1999; Han and Qiu, 2007) . But it has been ignored in previous literature in explaining cash reserve effects in acquisitions. Our paper is among the firsts to highlight its importance. It breaks a path for further researches on the implications of precautionary motive for merging firms. Second, we argue that the negative announcement effect of bidder cash reserve is due to revaluation. The precautionary motive suggests an opposite principle-agency relationship than the agency theory. Lower bidder return does not destroy long-term shareholder value if it is only a correction to mispricing. Rather, high cash reserve facilitates merging firms to capture synergies that arise from the combination of business. Third, our study adds to a large literature on the information effects of corporate cash reserve (Bhattachaya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; John and Williams, 1985；Opler et al. 1999; Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2006; Gao, 2011) .
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature in order to provide better context and motivation for this study; Section 3 describes sample and data; Section 4 formulates hypotheses, describes methodology and reports results from empirical analysis; and Section 5 concludes.
[ Table 1 ]
Literature Review

The Precautionary Motive and Its Implications for Acquisitions
When capital market is perfect, there is no need for a company to reserve cash as it can always raise external capital at the cost appropriate for investment risk. However, when there is information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Opler et al., 1999) or agency cost of debt (Myers, 1977; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , external capital is more expensive than internal funds. Companies therefore may forego value-enhancing investment opportunities because the cost of external capital is prohibitively high. To avoid such underinvestment problem, company management rationally stockpiles cash if it expects high growth in the future (Opler et al., 1999; Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2006) . 6 A high cash reserve enables the management to take a value-enhancing investment project without resorting to expensive external capital. In other words, cash reserve adds value by enable companies to investment in projects that otherwise would appear to be value-reducing if external funds are the only source of finance. Therefore, other things equal, higher cash reserve relates to higher growth. Meanwhile, a high-growth (thus cash-rich) company has more value uncertainty than a company of low growth because growth opportunities are more difficult to evaluate than assets in place. In this paper, we argue that the level of cash reserve reflects both growth and misevaluation, which in turn determines the effects of cash reserve in acquisitions.
Growth has two contrasting effects on the probability of being a bidder. On the one hand, a high growth (thus cash-rich) company has motives to make acquisitions. Brainard and Tobin (1977) maintain that a company of high Tobin's Q ratio (i.e., market value over replacement cost of capital) invests more than other companies do. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) argue that a high-Q company is more likely to become a bidder than a low-Q company. Dong et al. (2006) find evidence consistent with these arguments. On the other hand, a high-growth bidder is more likely to be at odd with its target in terms of the means of 6 The market may not share the management's view.
payment. Specifically, a target prefers cash payment because it believes the value of a stock offer from a high-growth bidder is difficult to judge. A high-growth bidder, however, prefers to pay using stock because it tends to reserve cash to fund future growth. Such potential conflicts increase acquisition cost and discourage a company to bid.
The precautionary motive's effect on a bidder's announcement returns also has twofold. Growth positively affects bidder announcement returns because a deal announcement resolves investment uncertainty (Schlingemann, 2004) and signals high growth (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) . On the other hand, a high-growth bidder has more value uncertainty than a low-growth bidder, and is more likely to be overvalued. A bidder is unlikely to be undervalued because i) undervaluation means bidder shareholders have to give up a greater share of their company to target shareholders (Myers and Majluf, 1984; RhodesKropf and Viswananthan, 2004) , and ii) it also makes a cash offer more difficult to finance.
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At announcement, bidder overvaluation is corrected through two mechanisms. First, acquisitions are salient events and attract much attention from investors. Market scrutiny leads to revaluation of a bidder's stock (Dong, et al., 2006) . Second, cash reserve has an adverse selection effect, i.e. if a company does not have to issue stock to invest, an attempt to do so sends a strong signal of overvaluation. Using a sample of all-stock offers, Gao (2011) finds that the negative announcement effect of cash reserve is due to adverse selection. than a cash-poor one. To the extent that debt reduces the agency cost of free cash flow by forcing managers to pay out cash, Maloney and Mitchell (1993) find that a bidder of higher leverage ratio has better returns at acquisition announcement.
Yet, there is another thread of argument regarding the agency conflicts arising from excessive cash reserve: the managerial discretion motive. An excessive cash reserve can shield managers from the monitoring of external capital market, because managers do not rely on external investors to fund investments (Jensen, 1986; Opler et al. 1999; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008) . Insulated from external monitoring, managers are less bothered about their fiduciary duty when proposing acquisitions. They select a bad deal simply because they are less concerned about shareholders' wealth.
Sample and Data
Our initial sample of acquisitions is from the SDC M&A database covering the period of leverage. Although rank-sum tests show that the difference in G-Index is statistically significant, the magnitude of the difference is not economically meaningful. In our logistic analysis, we control for these variables, which affect the probability of being a bidder according to previous literature.
In the right-most section of panel A, we separate the company-years whose excess cash reserve ratios are in the top quartile (high-excess-cash-reserve company-years) from other company-years. 11 The company-years of high excess cash reserve ratio have a median market-to-book ratio of 1.806, and a median residual market-to-book ratio of -0.481. Both are significantly (1%) higher than those of the company-years of low excess cash reserve ratio (1.697 for market-to-book ratio and -0.541 for residual market-to-book ratio). This is consistent with the view that high cash reserve is associated with high growth.
For our analysis of announcement effects, we use the cross section of all acquisitions that has required data. percentage of stake in the target sought by the bidder. As the announcement effect of cash reserve is more pronounced for those bidders unanticipated by market (Harford, 1999) , we distinguish between the predicted and unpredicted bidders, and report the summary statistics for each type. We explain in detail how we classify predicted and unpredicted bidders in Appendix II. We calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from 2 days before to 2 days after the announcement day for both bidders and targets based on the market model.
The estimation period is a 250-day window ending 15 trading days before the announcement day (we require at least 40 daily stock returns in the estimation window). Average bidder CAR is -0.008 (median -0.007) and significant at 1% (1%) (significance not tabulated in the table for the sake of brevity). Average bidder actual cash reserve ratio is 0.24 (median 0.118).
Average excess cash reserve ratio is -0.031 (median -0.066). Asset tangibility (i.e., tangible assets over total assets) has a mean of 0.865 and a median of 0.917. G-Index has a mean value of 9.213 and a median value of 9.000. In columns 3-5, we separate the sample into a high-and a low-excess-cash-reserve group according to the 75th sample percentile of excess cash reserve ratio, and report the median values of the variables. Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to test the statistical significance of the difference between these two groups. We note that the CAR of the high-excess-cash-reserve group (median -0.008) is lower than that of the low-excess-cash group (median -0.007), but the difference is statically insignificant. Later we use multivariate regression analysis to examine the cash reserve effect on bidder announcement returns, controlling for other effect on bidder CAR. The high-excess-cashreserve group has significantly (at 1%) higher tangible assets and higher sales growth, and significantly (at 10%) lower Overpay and market-to-book ratio, compared to the low-excesscash-reserve group. Other variables do not differ significantly between the high-and lowexcess-cash-reserve groups. Columns 6-8 separate the predicted bidders into a high-and a low-excess-cash-reserve group. The high-excess-cash-reserve group has a median CAR of -0.011, lower than the median of -0.006 for the low-excess-cash-reserve group. However, the difference is statistically insignificant. The high-excess-cash-reserve group has greater asset tangibility, higher return on assets, higher historical sales growth, and are less likely to overpay the target (all differences are statistically significant at 10% or above). Regarding other variables, the predicted bidders of high and low excess cash reserve are similar.
Column 9-11 separate the unpredicted bidders into a high-and a low-excess-cash-reserve group. The median CAR for the high (low) -excess-cash-reserve group is -0.004 (-0.007), but the difference is statistically insignificant. The high-excess-cash-reserve group has higher asset tangibility and historical sales growth, but similar to the low-excess-cash-reserve group in terms of other variables. In our multivariate regression analysis, we control for these variables that, suggested by previous literature, affect bidder announcement returns.
[ Table 2 ]
Empirical Results
Predicting Bidder
We set out by estimating the cash reserve effect on the probability of being bidder.
The baseline model is a logistic specification:
where i and t index companies and years respectively. Acquisition is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a company announces one or more acquisitions in a year, and zero otherwise.
Excash is log (1 + excess cash reserve ratio). YDUM is a vector of year dummy variables from 1980 to 2008. INDDUM is a vector of industry dummy variables defined using FamaFrench 12 industries. Controls is a vector of control variables. The set of control variables includes the logarithm of 1 plus market-to-book ratio, the logarithm of total assets, the logarithm of 1 plus the leverage ratio (defined as book value of long-term debt over book value of equity), mean abnormal return (defined as the average daily market-model-adjusted return over the 3 years prior to the announcement day), return standard deviation (defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns estimated over the 3 years prior to the announcement day), logarithm of 1 plus the average annual sales growth over the 5 years prior to announcement, price-to-earnings ratio, and the logarithm of G-Index.
12 Table 3 , panel A reports the distribution of high-and low-excess-cash-reserve companies across bidder company-years and non-bidder company-years. The left section 12 Logarithms are taken for those variables of high skewness so that we mitigate the bias introduced by skewness to the estimation.
separates the sample into high-and low-excess-cash-reserve groups based on the 75th sample percentile. In the high-excess-cash-reserve group, there are 682 (11.93%) bidder company-years and 5035 (88.07%) non-bidder company-years. In the low-excess-cashreserve group, there are 1968 (11.50%) bidder company-years versus 15138 (88.50%) nonbidder company-years. The Pearson's Chi-square statistic is 0.752, and therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of company-years across the bidder and the non-bidder categories does not change according to the level of excess cash reserve. In the middle section, we first segment the sample into a high residual market-to-book group and a low residual market-to-book group, according the 75th sample percentile. Within each group, we further separate the sample into a high-and a low-excess-cash-reserve group based on the 75th sample percentile. We find that, when residual market-to-book ratio is high, the highexcess-cash-reserve group has a significantly (at 5%) lower proportion (14.54%) of bidder company-years than the low-excess-cash-reserve group (16.77%). When residual market-tobook ratio is low however, the high-excess-cash-reserve group has significantly higher (at 10%) proportion (10.84%) of bidder company-years than the low-excess-cash-reserve group (9.98%). This suggests that when growth is high, a cash-rich company is less likely to be a bidder. However, when growth is low, a cash-rich company is more likely to acquire. In the right section, we first separate the sample by G-Index and then by bidder excess cash reserve, using the 75th percentiles of each variable. However, we do not find any significant difference in the distribution of the high-and low-excess-cash-reserve groups across bidder and non-bidder company-years. The preliminary univariate results above are obtained without controlling for other effects. In panel B, we move on to our regression analysis. Harford (1999) . Consistent with Harford (1999) , we find that the coefficient of log (1 + excess cash reserve) is 0.084 (significant at 10%), suggesting that, for an average company, a one standard-deviation increase in the excess cash reserve ratio increases the probability of it becoming a bidder next year by 0.13%. In model 2, we add G-Index to the specification.
This reduces the sample size dramatically from 32343 to 8111. We find that for the group of company-years where G-Index is available (mostly large and medium-sized companies), the effect of cash reserve on the probability of being a bidder is much weaker (coefficient 0.015) and statistically insignificant. We next expand the sample period to 1980-2008, our full sample period, and re-estimate equation (1) with and without G-Index. In model 3, log(1 + excess cash reserve) has a coefficient of -0.042 (significant at 5%), suggesting that a onestandard-deviation increase in excess cash reserve ratio of an average company reduces the probability of it becoming a bidder next year by 0.09%. When we add G-Index to the specification, the coefficient of log(1 + excess cash reserve) is -0.065 but is only marginally significant with a p-value of 0.106. In model 5 and 6, we re-estimate equation (1) using the sample period of 1994-2008, with and without the G-Index. In model 5, the coefficient of log(1 + excess cash reserve) is -0.068 (significant at 1%), suggesting that a one-standarddeviation increase in the excess cash reserve of an average company reduces the probability of it being a bidder in the next year by 0.15%. In model 6, we estimate equation (1) adding G-Index as a control variable, and the coefficient of the log(1 + excess cash reserve) is -0.087 (significant at 10%). These results show that the positive effect of excess cash reserve on a company's probability of being a bidder is only true for small companies in the early sample period of 1980-1993. For the later sample period (i.e., 1994-2008) , the cash reserve effect on the probability of being a bidder is negative. When G-Index is required to be available (mainly large and medium-sized companies), the cash reserve effect is significantly (at 10%) negative for the later period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) and marginally significantly negative for the full sample period. As is discussed in the introduction, the negative cash reserve effect on the probability of being a bidder is consistent with the argument that a high cash reserve is associated with high growth. High-growth bidders are more likely to be at odd with the target regarding means of payment, because they prefer stock payment in order to reserve cash for future growth, but the targets favour cash payment as they don't like value uncertainty. A company rationally expects the costs associated with such conflicts and refrains from making an offer.
In panel C of table 3, we perform further analysis on how cash reserve affects the probability of being a bidder, by introducing variation to the degree of precautionary motive and agency conflicts. Using the residual market-to-book ratio (defined in the introduction),
we ensure the variation in the market-to-book ratio is independent of the variation of agency conflicts (measured by G-index). The specifications is as follows:
, where High Residual Market -to -book dummy is 1 if a company's residual market-to-book ratio is above the 75 th percentile of the sample in a year, and 0 otherwise.
High G -Index Dummy is 1 if a company's G-Index is above the 75 th percentile of the sample in a year, and 0 otherwise.
The precautionary motive suggests that high growth drives the relation between cash reserve and the probability of being a bidder. Therefore, stronger cash reserve effect on the probability of being a bidder should manifest itself for a company of higher residual marketto-book ratio (strong precautionary motive). The effect is a priori twofold as we explained earlier because, on the one hand, a high-growth company is more likely to make an acquisition, but on the other hand it refrains from making an offer because it rationally expect that the target will not cooperate on the means of payment. Because our results in panel B suggests that in general, the later effect dominate the earlier one, our alternative hypothesize under the precautionary motive is 0
Under the agency theory, a cash-rich company of greater agency problem (high Gindex) is more likely to make an acquisition. The alternative hypothesis under the agency theory therefore is 0   . Table 3 , panel C reports the results based on equation (2) (model 1) and (3) (model 2).
Model 1 shows that the negative cash-reserve effect on the probability of being a bidder comes entirely from the high residual market-to-book ratio companies. The coefficient on the interaction term is -0.150. Combined with the coefficient of excess cash reserve, it suggests that, for a company of high residual market-to-book ratio, a one-standard deviation increase in its excess cash reserve ratio reduces the probability of being a bidder by 0.52%. In model 2 however, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and statistically insignificant, inconsistent with the prediction of agency theory.
[ Table 3 ]
Excess Cash Reserve and Bidder Announcement Returns
To examine the announcement effect, we begin with estimating two baseline specifications below. We use weighted least square regressions to mitigate the bias from heteroskedasticity: 
, where i indexes deals. Bidder CAR is bidder cumulative abnormal return from 2 days before to 2 days after the announcement day, estimated using a market model. YDUM is a vector of year dummy variables from 1980 to 2008. INDDUM is a vector of industry dummy variables defined based on the Fama-French 12 industries. Controls is a vector of control variables, it includes the logarithm of market value of equity, the logarithm of 1 plus marketto-book ratio, asset tangibility (defined as tangible assets over total assets), the logarithm of return on assets (defined as the ratio of net income to total assets), the logarithm of 1 plus the annual sales growth in the past 5 (at least 3) years, the pre-acquisition bidder cumulative abnormal return measured over a 240-day window ending 15 trading days before the announcement date, overpay (a measure of target gain relative to bidder size, calculated by first taking the product of target CAR, target market value of equity, and the percentage stake in target sought by the bidder, then dividing this product by bidder market value of equity), a dummy variable which is 1 for tender offers and 0 otherwise, a dummy variable which is 1 when a bidder and a target are in different Fama-French 12 industries and 0 otherwise, a dummy variable which is 1 for friendly acquisitions and 0 otherwise, relative deal value (defined as deal value divided by the sum of bidder market value of equity and book value of debt), logarithm of 1 plus leverage (defined as the ratio of book value of longterm debt to book value of equity), the logarithm of G-Index, and stock payment (defined as the percentage of stock in the consideration). Equation (1) does not distinguish between predicted and unpredicted bidders, but equation (2) Since the market only responds to unexpected news, we expect 3  is greater in absolute value than 2  . This translates into a value decrease of $27 million for an average bidder in our sample. In model 2, we add the percentage of stock payment to control for the effects of means of payment. The percentage of stock payment has a significantly (at 1%) negative coefficient of -0.025, consistent with previous findings of Travlos (1987 ), Franks, et al. (1988 , Asquith, et al. (1987 ), Wansley, et al. (1987 , Servaes (1991), and Martin (1996) . The coefficient of excess cash reserve remains qualitatively unchanged. Models 3 distinguishes between the predicted and unpredicted bidders. We find that the negative effect of cash reserve is mainly from unpredicted bidders. The coefficient of the interaction term of the unpredicted bidder dummy and excess cash reserve ratio is -0.012 (significant at 1%). In contrast, the coefficient of the interaction term between the predicted bidder dummy and the excess cash reserve ratio is -0.008 and statistically insignificant. In model 4, we add the percentage of stock payment as an additional control variable, and the coefficient of the interaction term between cash reserve and unpredicted bidder dummy remains significant (at 1%) at -0.011. The results in panel A of table 4 show that the negative cash-reserve effect on bidder announcement return documented by previous studies exists for our sample as well. This result does not speak to the relative strength of the precautionary motive and the agency theory however. We tackle this issue in panel B, by introducing variation to the strength of the precautionary motive and the agency theory respectively.
In table 4, panel B, we further examine whether the negative cash-reserve effect vary according to 1) the level of information uncertainty, and 2) the degree of agency conflicts.
Under the precautionary motive, the negative announcement cash reserve effect is due to adjustment to overvaluation and therefore should be stronger when the bidder has greater information uncertainty. We use asset tangibility (i.e. tangible assets over total assets) as a proxy for information uncertainty, because tangible assets are easier to evaluate than intangible assets. We do not use the residual market-to-book ratio here because it measures both growth and misvaluation, and these two aspects of the precautionary motive has contrasting predictions of the cash reserve effects on bidder announcement returns. Under the agency theory, the negative cash reserve effect of a high-G-Index company should be greater than that of a low-G-Index company. Specifically, we estimate the following two specifications: 
, where High - Tangibility  is 0.004 and statistically insignificant. This means the negative cash reserve effect on bidder announcement return is not stronger for a company that have greater agency conflict, contrary to the prediction of the agency theory.
[ Table 4] 4.3 Post-acquisition Operating Performance
In this section, we examine how cash reserve relates to a bidder's post-acquisition operating performance. We perform our analysis using completed deals. The precautionary motive suggests that a cash-rich bidder have better operating performance for two reasons.
First, high growth leads to better operating performance in the long-run. Second, high cash reserve also relates to high bidder overvaluation and thus more dramatic price correction at deal announcement. When price correction is more negative, higher synergies are necessary to attract the merging companies to participate. Because synergies manifest themselves in the long-run, cash-rich bidders' operating performance improves relative to cash-poor bidders'.
In contrast, the agency theory predicts that cash-rich bidders have worse operating performance in the long run compared to cash-poor bidders.
To measure operating performance, we follow the spirit of Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) , Harford (1999) and Powell and Stark (2005) . We first calculate the actual operating performance as operating cash flow over total assets. We then, for every year, adjust the actual operating performance using the median value of other companies that belong to the same excess-cash-reserve quartile of the same Fama-French 12 industry. This is to address the concern that company characteristics affect operating performance so that we cannot attribute the change in actual operating performance post acquisition entirely to the acquisition itself (Barber and Lyon, 1996) . The adjusted operating performances are averaged over 4 years both prior to the acquisition announcement and subsequent to the deal completion.
In model 1 of table 5, we estimate a regression of post-acquisition operating performance on pre-acquisition operating performance. The constant term is 0.007 (significant at 1%), suggesting that an average bidder has an annual abnormal operating performance of 0.7% in the 4 years after deal completion. In model 2, we add a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bidder's excess cash reserve ratio is in the highest sample quartile and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of the high-excess-cash-reserve dummy is -0.003 but statistically insignificant. In model 3, we further introduce a dummy variable which is 1 if a bidder is in the highest residual market-to-book sample quartile and belongs to the highest excess cash reserve quartile at the same time, 0 otherwise. We find that the coefficient of this dummy variable is 0.010 (significant at 5%). The coefficient of the high-excess-cash-reserve dummy variable however is -0.004 (significant at 10%), suggesting the agency theory has marginal effect. A Wald test shows that the sum of the coefficients of these two dummy variables is significant positive (at 10%), consistent with the argument that, when bidder growth is high, higher cash reserve is associated with better post-acquisition operating performance. The result of equation 3 suggests that when growth is high, a cash-rich bidder operationally out perform a cash-poor bidder by 1.4% a year post acquisitions. In model 4, we introduce an alternative dummy variable equal to 1 if a bidder is in the highest G-Index quartile and at the same time in the highest excess cash reserve quartile, 0 otherwise. Neither the coefficient of this new dummy variable nor the sum of the coefficients of this new dummy variable and the coefficient of the high-excess-cash-reserve dummy is statistically significant, contrary to the prediction of agency theory.
[ Table 5 ]
Post-acquisition Use of Funds
In this section, we further examine how a bidder's pre-acquisition excess cash reserve relates to its post-acquisition use of funds. The precautionary motive and the agency theory have differing predictions. When growth is high, a cash-rich bidder is more likely to use funds on capital expenditure, inventory, and R&D. When overvaluation is high, a cash-rich bidder is more likely to use funds to reduce long-term debt (Stein, 1996; Hertzel and Li, 2009; and Kim and Weisbach, 2006) . When agency conflicts are high, a cash-rich bidder uses more funds on acquisitions (Jensen, 1986; Opler, et al. 1999; Harford, et al. 2008 ).
We follow the method of Hertzel and Li (2009) and Kim and Weisbach (2008) to track the amount of funds that bidders use on reduction of long-term debt, inventory, capital expenditure, R&D, and acquisitions. To control for company size, all accounting variables are deflated by total assets measured at the last fiscal year end prior to deal announcement.
Specifically, for the income statement and cash flow statement items (i.e., funds used on long-term debt reduction, capital expenditure, R&D, and acquisitions), we calculate the accumulation of each item since the first year after the acquisition, deflated by preacquisition total assets: withdrawn, we use the bidder's figure. We use a set of regressions to estimate the relation between a bidder's pre-acquisition excess cash reserve and its post-acquisition use of funds, controlling for other effects. To a considerable extent, the amount of funds that a bidder generates post acquisition affects the bidder's use of funds. We therefore control for a bidder's total funds generated after an acquisition. We also include bidder pre-acquisition actual cash reserve ratio to control for all the missing factors that affect the actual level of cash reserve. Specifically, we estimate 
, where Industry dummies are defined based on the Fama-French 12 industries. For each time horizon, i.e., t  1 to 4, a cross-sectional regression is estimated for each of the five accounting variables. Equation (10) omits firm subscripts for the sake of brevity. Table 6 reports regression results based on equation (10). We find mixed evidence for the hypothesis that high excess cash reserve relates to high growth. In the capitalexpenditure regressions, the coefficients of log(1 + excess cash reserve ratio) are significantly (significant at 1%) positive for all post-acquisition years. But in the R&D regressions, the coefficients of log(1 + excess cash reserve ratio) are all significantly (1%)
negative. It suggests that cash-rich bidders pursue growth in established business rather than business innovations. In the inventory regressions, none of the coefficient of log(1 + excess cash reserve ratio) is significant except that for year 2 (-0.007 and significant at 10%). We find some support for overvaluation. In particular, in the regressions of long-term debt reduction, we document that coefficients of log(1 + excess cash reserve ratio) are 0.014, 0.014, 0.21, and 0.44 for years 1,2,3,and 4 respectively (all significant at 10% or above except for that of year 2). Contrary to the prediction of the agency theory, the coefficient of log(1 + excess cash reserve ratio) is significantly (10% or above) negative in all regressions that use funds spent on acquisitions as the dependent variable.
[ Table 6 ]
Conclusion
In this study, we argue that the precautionary motive provides a meaningful theoretical framework to understand bidder cash reserve effects in acquisitions. The precautionary motive argues that, in an imperfect capital market, the level of a company's cash reserve is positively associated with managers' perception of future growth and a company's value uncertainty. We find that a cash-rich company is less likely to be a bidder during 1994-2008. This negative effect is particularly pronounced where precautionary motive is strong. We further find higher bidder cash reserve relates to lower bidder announcement returns, but such an effect vanishes when a bidder has little value uncertainty.
In post acquisition years, cash-rich bidders outperform (in terms of operating performance) cash-poor bidders when bidders have high growth. However, cash-rich bidders do not underperform cash-poor ones when the agency conflicts are more severe. Finally, we find that, in post-acquisition years, cash-rich bidders spend more funds on capital expenditure and reduction of long-term debt but less on acquisitions. Overall, most of our evidence can be comfortably interpreted using the precautionary motive, but the agency theory has very limited explanatory power. Residual Market-to-book ratio Each year, we regress the market-to-book ratio on the logarithm of 1 plus G-Index. The residual from the regressions are residual market-to-book ratio.
Same as definition G-Index
The governance index designed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . The higher the governance index, the greater the agency conflicts.
See Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) Average sales growth Average sales growth of a company in the past 5 years (at least 3 years) Total sources of funds The sum of funds generated from operations (FOPT), sales of property, plant and equipment (SPPE), sale of common and preferred stock (SSTK), long-term debt issuances (DLTIS) and other sources of funds (FSRCO).
Total Sources of Funds = FOPT + SPPE + SSTK + DLTIS + FSRCO
Appendix I: continued
Table 1 Predicted Effects of Corporate Cash Reserve in Different Stages of Acquisition
This table summarizes the predicted effects of cash reserve on the probability of being a bidder, the bidder announcement returns, bidder post-acquisition operating performance, and bidder post-acquisition use of funds. (+) means a positive effect, and (-) means a negative effect. Detailed explanation are provided in the introduction and literature review sections.
Effect on probability of Effect on bidder Effect on postacquisition operating
Effect on probability of being a bidder Effect on bidder announcement returns acquisition operating performance Effect on post-acquisition use of funds The agency thoery
A cash-rich bidder spends more on acquisitions than a cash-poor bidder (Jensen, 1986) .
The precautionary motive
Growth (+), (-) (+) (+)
A cash-rich bidder spends more on capital expenditure (Capex), inventory or R&D than a cash-poor bidder (Kim and Weisbach, 2006; Hertzel and Li, 2009 ).
Overvaluation (+), (-) (-) (+)
A cash-rich bidder spends more on debt reduction than a cash-poor bidder (Stein, 1996 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for the Panel Data Used for Predicting Bidder
Panel A reports mean and median (for the full sample) and median (for subsamples) of the variables that are used to predict bidders. The sample period is 1980-2008. Actual cash reserve ratio is cash and short-term investment divided by total assets net of cash and short-term investment. Excess cash reserve ratio is the difference between the actual cash reserve ratio and the required cash reserve ratio estimated using a cross-sectional OLS regression for each of the Fama-French 12 industries in each year. Market-to-book is the sum of market value of equity and book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of book value of equity and book value of longterm debt. Leverage is the ratio of book value of long-term debt to book value of equity. Mean abnormal return is the average daily market-model-adjusted returns over the 3 years prior to the announcement day. Return standard deviation is the standard deviation of daily stock returns estimated over the 3 years prior to deal announcement. Average sales growth is measured over 5 years piror to announcement . Non-cash working capital is working capital minus cash and short-term investment then divided by total assets. Price to earnings is the ratio of price to earnings per share. G-Index is the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . Residual market-to-book is the residual from an OLS regression, estimated each year, of market-to-book ratio on the logarithm of 1 plus the GIndex. Subsamples are formed according to whether a company is a bidder or not in a year, or whether a bidder's excess cash reserve ratio is above or below the 75th percentile of the sample in a year. All variables except the G-Index are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Wilcoxon rank sum tests are used to test the significance of differences between the bidder and non-bidder company-years. *, **, and *** denote sinificance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel B: Summary Statistics for The Sample Used to Estimate the Bidder's Announcement Abnormal Returns
Panel B reports mean and median (for the full sample) and median (for the subsamples) of the variables used to estimate the effects of cash reserve on bidders' announcement abnormal returns. The full sample covers the period of 1980 -2008 is the market-model-adjusted return from 2 days before to 2 days after the announcement day (day 0). Actual cash reserve ratio is cash and short-term investment over total assets net of cash and short-term investment. Excess cash reserve ratio is the difference between the actual cash reserve ratio and the required cash reserve ratio estimated using a cross-sectional OLS regression for each of the Fama-French 12 industries in each year. Market value is the product of stock price and number of common shares outstanding at fiscal year end. Market-to-book is the sum of market value of equity and book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of book value of equity and book value of long-term debt. Asset tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of net income to total assets. Average sales growth is the annual growth in sales averaged over 5 years prior to the announcement day. CAR (-255,-15 ) is the cumulative abnormal returns from day -255 to day -15 based on market model. Overpay measures the target shareholders' gain relative to the size of a bidder. It is calculated by first taking the product of target CAR, target market value of equity, and the percentage target stake sought by the bidder, then dividing this product by bidder market value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of book value of long-term debt to book value of equity. G-Index is the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . Post-acquisition operating cash flow performance is a bidder's annual operating performance averaged over 4 years after deal completion. Pre-acquisition operating performance is a market-value-weighted average of a bidder's and a target's annual operating performance, averaged over 4 years before deal announcement. Relative deal value is deal value over bidder market value of assets. Operating performance is measured as operating cash flow over total assets, adjusted by the median operating performance of other firms in the same excess cash reserve ratio decile of a same industry of the Fama-French 12-industry classification. Subsamples are formed according to whether a company's excess cash reserve is above or below the 75th sample percentile, and whether a bidder is predicted or not. All company characteristics are measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to deal announcement, unless otherwise described. Z-statistic is based on Wilcoxon rank sum test for median differences. *, **, and *** denote sinificance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel B reports mean and median (for the full sample) and median (for the subsamples) of the variables used to estimate the effects of cash reserve on bidders' announcement abnormal returns. The full sample covers the period of 1980-2008. CAR(-2, +2) is the market-model-adjusted return from 2 days before to 2 days after the announcement day (day 0). Actual cash reserve ratio is cash and short-term investment over total assets net of cash and short-term investment. Excess cash reserve ratio is the difference between the actual cash reserve ratio and the required cash reserve ratio estimated using a cross-sectional OLS regression for each of the Fama-French 12 industries in each year. Market value is the product of stock price and number of common shares outstanding at fiscal year end. Market-to-book is the sum of market value of equity and book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of book value of equity and book value of long-term debt. Asset tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of net income to total assets. Average sales growth is the annual growth in sales averaged over 5 years prior to the announcement day. CAR (-255,-15 ) is the cumulative abnormal returns from day -255 to day -15 based on market model. Overpay measures the target shareholders' gain relative to the size of a bidder. It is calculated by first taking the product of target CAR, target market value of equity, and the percentage target stake sought by the bidder, then dividing this product by bidder market value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of book value of long-term debt to book value of equity. G-Index is the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . Post-acquisition operating cash flow performance is a bidder's annual operating performance averaged over 4 years after deal completion. Pre-acquisition operating performance is a market-value-weighted average of a bidder's and a target's annual operating performance, averaged over 4 years before deal announcement. Relative deal value is deal value over bidder market value of assets. Operating performance is measured as operating cash flow over total assets, adjusted by the median operating performance of other firms in the same excess cash reserve ratio decile of a same industry of the Fama-French 12-industry classification. Subsamples are formed according to whether a company's excess cash reserve is above or below the 75th sample percentile, and whether a bidder is predicted or not. All company characteristics are measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to deal announcement, unless otherwise described. Z-statistic is based on Wilcoxon rank sum test for median differences. *, **, and *** denote sinificance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. (-2, +2) is the market-model-adjusted return from 2 days before to 2 days after the announcement day (day 0). Actual cash reserve ratio is cash and short-term investment over total assets net of cash and short-term investment. Excess cash reserve ratio is the difference between the actual cash reserve ratio and the required cash reserve ratio estimated using a cross-sectional OLS regression for each of the Fama-French 12 industries in each year. Market value is the product of stock price and number of common shares outstanding at fiscal year end. Market-to-book is the sum of market value of equity and book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of book value of equity and book value of long-term debt. Asset tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of net income to total assets. Average sales growth is the annual growth in sales averaged over 5 years prior to the announcement day. CAR (-255,-15 ) is the cumulative abnormal returns from day -255 to day -15 based on market model. Overpay measures the target shareholders' gain relative to the size of a bidder. It is calculated by first taking the product of target CAR, target market value of equity, and the percentage target stake sought by the bidder, then dividing this product by bidder market value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of book value of long-term debt to book value of equity. G-Index is the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . Post-acquisition operating cash flow performance is a bidder's annual operating performance averaged over 4 years after deal completion. Pre-acquisition operating performance is a market-value-weighted average of a bidder's and a target's annual operating performance, averaged over 4 years before deal announcement. Relative deal value is deal value over bidder market value of assets. Operating performance is measured as operating cash flow over total assets, adjusted by the median operating performance of other firms in the same excess cash reserve ratio decile of a same industry of the Fama-French 12-industry classification. Subsamples are formed according to whether a company's excess cash reserve is above or below the 75th sample percentile, and whether a bidder is predicted or not. All company characteristics are measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to deal announcement, unless otherwise described. Z-statistic is based on Wilcoxon rank sum test for median differences. *, **, and *** denote sinificance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Table 3 The Effects of Excess Cash Reserve on the Probability of Being a Bidder
This table reports the results of univariate analysis and logistic regression analysis that estimate how excess cash reserve affects the probability of a company being a bidder in a year. The analysis is based on a panel data set which covers the period of 1980-2008. The dependent variable is 1 if a company makes one or more acquisitions in a year, and 0 otherwise. Panel A reports the univariate results. The distribution of bidders and non-bidders are reported across sub samples. The sub samples are formed according to high and low excess cash reserve ratio (using the 75th percentile of the sample), high and low residual market-to-book ratio (using the 75th percentile of the sample), and high and low G-Index (using the 75th percentile of the sample). Pearson's Chisquare statistics is calculated to test the independence of the distributions of bidders and non-bidder company-years across different sub samples. Values in parentheses are the p-values of Chisquare statistics. Panel B estimates the base-line models for three sample periods. Model 1 and 2 replicate Harfod's (1999) findings using a sample period similar to his (i.e., 1980-1993) . Model 3 and 4 use the full sample period (i.e., 1980-2008) . Model 5 and 6 use a sample period of 1994-2008. Variables are defined in panel A of table 1. In panel C, we add two interaction terms separately to the base-line regression. One interaction is formed using the excess cash reserve and a high residual market-to-book dummy. Residual market-to-book is the residual from an OLS regression of market-to-book ratio on the logarithm of 1 plus the G-Index, estimated cross-sectionally each year on all firms that have market-to-book ratio and G-index available. The high residual market-tobook dummy is 1 if a bidder is in the top quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. The G-index dummy is 1 if a bidder is in the top quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. Slopes are evaluated at the sample mean, and reported right to coefficients. p-values are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectivesly.
This table reports the results of univariate analysis and logistic regression analysis that estimate how excess cash reserve affects the probability of a company being a bidder in a year. The analysis is based on a panel data set which covers the period of 1980-2008. The dependent variable is 1 if a company makes one or more acquisitions in a year, and 0 otherwise. Panel A reports the univariate results. The distribution of bidders and non-bidders are reported across sub samples. The sub samples are formed according to high and low excess cash reserve ratio (using the 75th percentile of the sample), high and low residual market-to-book ratio (using the 75th percentile of the sample), and high and low G-Index (using the 75th percentile of the sample). Pearson's Chisquare statistics is calculated to test the independence of the distributions of bidders and non-bidder company-years across different sub samples. Values in parentheses are the p-values of Chisquare statistics. Panel B estimates the base-line models for three sample periods. Model 1 and 2 replicate Harfod's (1999) findings using a sample period similar to his (i.e., 1980-1993) . Model 3 and 4 use the full sample period (i.e., 1980-2008) . Model 5 and 6 use a sample period of 1994-2008. Variables are defined in panel A of table 1. In panel C, we add two interaction terms separately to the base-line regression. One interaction is formed using the excess cash reserve and a high residual market-to-book dummy. Residual market-to-book is the residual from an OLS regression of market-to-book ratio on the logarithm of 1 plus the G-Index, estimated cross-sectionally each year on all firms that have market-to-book ratio and G-index available. The high residual market-tobook dummy is 1 if a bidder is in the top quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. The G-index dummy is 1 if a bidder is in the top quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. Slopes are evaluated at the sample mean, and reported right to coefficients. p-values are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectivesly. 
This table reports the results of univariate analysis and logistic regression analysis that estimate how excess cash reserve affects the probability of a company being a bidder in a year. The analysis is based on a panel data set which covers the period of 1980-2008. The dependent variable is 1 if a company makes one or more acquisitions in a year, and 0 otherwise. Panel A reports the univariate results. The distribution of bidders and non-bidders are reported across sub samples. The sub samples are formed according to high and low excess cash reserve ratio (using the 75th percentile of the sample), high and low residual market-to-book ratio (using the 75th percentile of the sample), and high and low G-Index (using the 75th percentile of the sample). Pearson's Chisquare statistics is calculated to test the independence of the distributions of bidders and non-bidder company-years across different sub samples. Values in parentheses are the p-values of Chisquare statistics. Panel B estimates the base-line models for three sample periods. Model 1 and 2 replicate Harfod's (1999) findings using a sample period similar to his (i.e., 1980-1993) . Model 3 and 4 use the full sample period (i.e., 1980-2008) . Model 5 and 6 use a sample period of 1994-2008. Variables are defined in panel A of table 1. In panel C, we add two interaction terms separately to the base-line regression. One interaction is formed using the excess cash reserve and a high residual market-to-book dummy. Residual market-to-book is the residual from an OLS regression of market-to-book ratio on the logarithm of 1 plus the G-Index, estimated cross-sectionally each year on all firms that have market-to-book ratio and G-index available. The high residual market-tobook dummy is 1 if a bidder is in the top quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. The G-index dummy is 1 if a bidder is in the top quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. Slopes are evaluated at the sample mean, and reported right to coefficients. p-values are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectivesly. 110 1994-2008 1980-1993 1980-1993 1980-2008 1980-2008 1994-2008 Table 4 The
Effect of Excess Cash Reserve on Bidder Announcement Return
This table reports weighted least square regression estimates of the effects of excess cash reserve on bidder announcement returns, for the period of 1980-2008. The dependent variable is bidder announcement CAR from day -2 to day 2 (day 0 is the announcement day) estimated using a market model. High tangibility dummy is 1 if a bidder's asset tangibility is in the highest quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. Tender offer dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 for tender offers, and 0 otherwise. Diversifying deal dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a target and the bidder are in the same industry of the Fama-French 12-industry classification, and 0 otherwise. Friendly deal dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 for friendly deals, and 0 otherwise. High G-Index Dummy is 1 if a bidder's G-index is in the highest quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. Stock payments are stock payments as a percentage of the deal value. Predicted-bidder dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 for predicted bidder, and 0 otherwise (see Appendix II). Unpredicted-bidder dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 for unpredicted bidder, and 0 otherwise(see Appendix II). Other variables are defined in Panel B of table 1. All company characteristics are measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to deal announcement unless otherwise described. Regressions in panel A are based on equations (4) This table reports the weighted least square regression estimats of the effects of excess cash reserve on a bidder's post-acquisition operating performance. Only completed acquisitions are examined. The dependent variable is bidder post-acquisition operating cash flow performance averaged over 4 years after deal completion. Pre-acquisition operating performance is a market-value-weighted average of a bidder's and the target's operating performance, averaged over 4 years before deal announcement. The excess cash reserve dummy is 1 if a bidder's excess cash reserve is in the top quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. The high G-Index dummy is 1 if a company is in the top quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. The high residual market-to-book dummy is 1 if the redidual market-to-book ratio is in the top quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Panel B of table 1. The constant term captures abnormal operating performance after the acquisition attributable to the deal. The coefficient of the pre-acquisition operating performance captures the continuation of operating performance after the acquisition. Values in parentheses are p-values. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. for V = (funds used on) R&D, capital expenditure, long-term debt reduction and acquisitions, and for V = inventory, for t = 1 to 4. t = 0 denotes the fiscal year prior to deal announcement, and t = 1 to 4 are the 1st to the 4th year after deal completion/withdrawal. At t = 0, total assets and inventory is the sum of the bidder's and the target's when a deal is completed; when a deal is withdrawn, the bidder's figure is used. At t = 1 to 4, R&D, capital expenditure (CAPEX), long-term debt reduction (LT Debt Reduction), acquisitions, and inventory are for the bidder. Actual cash reserve ratio is cash and short-term investment over total assets net of cash and short-term investment. Excess cash reserve ratio is the difference between the actual cash reserve ratio and the required cash reserve ratio estimated using a cross-sectional OLS regression for each of the Fama-French 12 industries in each year. Total fund is the sum of funds from operations, sales of property, plant and equipment, sale of common and preferred stock, long-term debt issuances and other sources of funds, aggregated over the corresponding horizons. Relative deal value is deal value deflated by pre-acquisition bidder market value of assets. Size is the logarithm of a bidder's total assets in millions of dollars prior to acquisition announcement. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The cross-sectional regressions are specified below (firm subscripts are omitted for the sake of brevity). 
